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Free-riding in Student Software Development Teams: An 
Exploratory Study 
Jun He 




In the team literature there is much discussion about free-riding as a main obstacle for teams to achieve quality performance. 
Given its importance to team success, however, empirical study of the free-rider problem has lagged behind the conceptual 
work. So far, little research has been conducted in field settings to measure the scale of free-riding and investigate how the 
problem may deteriorate the productivity of collective actions. This study intends to examine the free-rider problem in project 
teams. 44 student software development teams participated in the study. An instrument was developed to capture the most 
salient free-riding behavior from team members; a research model with team morale and team size as the antecedents, and 
team cognition and team performance as the consequences of free-riding, was tested. Implications to both research and team 
practices are discussed.  
Keywords 
Free-riding, moral hazard, organizational citizenship behavior, team cognition, team performance. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern organizations have widely adopted the team approach as a way of accomplishing tasks which surpass the capabilities 
of single individuals (Glassop, 2002). Teams are viewed as “group(s) of two or more individuals who must interact 
cooperatively and adaptively in pursuit of shared valued objectives” (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; p. 223). To achieve team 
success, team members should engage in collective actions and restrict certain individual activities whose purposes are 
incompatible with or even contradictory to team objectives. Of the un-desirable behaviors, free-riding has long been argued 
as a main obstacle for teams to achieve quality performance (Olson, 1965; Price, 2006; Anesi, 2009).  
Free-riding, also labeled as social traps (Platt, 1973), commons problem (Edney, 1980), commons dilemma (Dawes et al., 
1977), assurance problem (Runge, 1984), and moral hazard in teams (Anesi, 2009), refers to an undesired behavior that a 
member of a group obtains benefits from group membership but does not bear a proportional share of the costs of providing 
the benefits (Albanese and Van Fleet, 1985). Free-riding deteriorates team productivity by tempting team members to be free-
riders and shirk in collective actions.  
Given its importance to team success, many studies have been conducted to understand, and develop means to cope with, the 
detrimental behavior of free-riding. Early group and organizational theorists have focused on the causes of free-riding under 
the theoretical umbrella of public goods (e.g., Olson, 1965; Stroebe and Frey, 1982; Runge, 1984; Albanese and Van Fleet, 
1985); experimental studies derived from the prisoner’s dilemma game (Luce and Raiffa, 1957) have been conducted to study 
how group size, nature of task (mostly temporary tasks), and individual differences affect one’s tendency of free-riding (for a 
review, see Albanese and Van Fleet, 1985); recent research in this area employs mathematic modeling and studies 
reward/sanction systems under which free-riding behaviors can be discouraged (e.g., Dijk et al., 2001; Price, 2006; Anesi, 
2009). Empirical study has largely lagged behind the conceptual work. So far, little research has been conducted in field 
settings to measure the scale of free-riding and investigate the extent to which the problem deteriorates the productivity of 
collective actions.  
To fill the research gap, this study intends to examine the free-rider problem in project teams. The paper is organized as 
follows. After reviewing the research of free-riding, organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), and team cognition in social 
and organizational behavior, a research model was proposed with team morale and team size as the antecedents, and team 
cognition and team performance as the consequences, of free-riding. A research strategy was designed to use student software 
development teams as the research subject. An instrument was developed to capture free-riding behaviors from team 
members. After empirical testing of the research model, the results and implications of the study are discussed.  
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This study intends to investigate the antecedences as well as the consequences of free-riding in team settings. A research 
model is presented in Figure 1. 
 
Note:  
1. Signs indicate a hypothesized effect is positive or negative; 
Figure 1. Research Model 
Free-riding 
The notion of free-riding can be backdated to the early seminal work of Olson (1965). Of the large literature on inefficiencies 
in collective actions, all studies point the free-rider problem as a main obstacle to achieve the desired outcomes (Anesi, 
2009). The cause of free-riding is rather intuitive. Price (2006) summarized the cause as below: 
“If each member receives an equal share of the benefit that the group produces, no matter how much that member 
contributed to the production effort, then each member has a private incentive to contribute less than co-members. 
This incentive to freeride exists because if all members benefit equally, then the members who contributed the least 
to production will reap the highest net benefits (p. 20).” 
Underlying the above analysis are two assumptions about human nature: (1) people are egotistic so that personal interests 
always surpass collective benefits of others; and (2) people are conscious so that they tend to perform activities whose 
perceived benefits outweigh perceived costs. Thus, the literature suggests two solutions to the free-rider problem: (1) 
designing reward systems to direct social benefits toward cooperators, and/or (2) designing sanction systems to impose social 
costs on freeriders (Yamagishi, 1986; Hawkes, 1993; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Andreoni et al., 2003; Price, 2006). The 
element of the two solutions is the same: reducing the incentive (the difference between the estimated benefits and costs) to 
free-ride in order to encourage one’s participation in collective activities.  
However, designing new reword/sanction systems could be very challenging, if not impossible, in many situations. Other 
approaches need to be explored to address the free-rider problem. The research of OCB provides another perspective on 
studying this issue. 
Team Morale and Organizational Citizenship Behavior 
People are not always self-centered. Researchers have noted the existence of altruistic behavior in organizational settings 
where people make voluntary efforts at work beyond prescribed specifications and tasks. Such behaviors are labeled as 
Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) in the literature. OCB that was derived from the Organ’s (1988) work has 
received the most research attention (Hoffman et al., 2007). According to Organ (1988), OCB refers to: 
“individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that 
in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization. By discretionary, I mean that the behavior is 
… rather a matter of personal choice, such that its omission is not generally understood as punishable” (p. 4).  
OCB can be viewed as an extreme opposite of free-riding behaviors. Free-riding is driven by personal interests, while OCB 
promotes collective benefits by performing voluntary activities. OCB research implies alternative solutions to counteract 
free-riding without the burden of designing new reward/sanction systems.  
A meta-analysis of the OCB literature supports the conclusion that job attitudes are robust predictors of OCB (Organ and 
Ryan, 1994). Researchers make suggestions to organizations to maintain high morale among workforce such as work 
attitudes and job satisfaction for favorable behaviors such as OCB (Randall et al., 1999). In a study of temporary workers, 
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researchers find that employees with strong job commitment and motivations to taking assignments present high levels of 
OCB in client organizations (Moorman and Harland, 2002).  
By definition, the presence of OCB means the lack of free-riding behaviors. People who have positive attitudes and strong 
commitments about their work are less likely to be free-riders when working with their colleagues. In cohesive social 
networks such as project teams, people’s perceptions of and attitudes about their assignments are largely determined by social 
influence from peers (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978; Meyer, 1994). Thus, a team’s collective attitudes about team tasks (defined 
as team morale in the study) will affect individuals’ attitudes, and therefore their behaviors, of participating in team actions. 
In the team, the more positive collective attitudes are about the tasks (or higher level of team morale), the less likely a team 
member will shirk in team activities and be a free-rider.  
Hypothesis 1: Team morale has a negative effect on the scale of free-riding in the team.    
Team Size 
The free-rider problem is rooted in the rational comparison between the expected benefits and estimated costs of free-riding 
(Olson, 1967; Price 2006). The difference, viewed as an incentive, grows with the number of people involved in the target 
collective action (Albanese and Van Fleet, 1985; Anesi, 2009). Compared with small groups, individuals in large groups are 
more likely conclude that there is no perceptible difference between contributing and not contributing, therefore increasing 
the tendency of free-riding (Albanese and Van Fleet, 1985). Thus, large teams/organizations are expected to be the most 
affected by the free-rider problem.  
Hypothesis 2: Team size has a positive effect on the scale of free-riding in the team.   
Team Cognition and Team Performance 
Team cognition refers to the mental models collectively held by a group of individuals which enable them to accomplish 
tasks by acting as a coordinated unit. This team-level integration of mental models functions as a mental template which is 
imposed on information environments to give them form and meaning, providing a cognitive foundation for action (Walsh, 
1995).  
The concept of team cognition has been proposed as a valid theoretical lens for examining team interactions (Cannon-Bowers 
et al., 1993; Cooke et al., 2000; Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994). Effective teams need to exchange and process information 
and knowledge among team members. Such team interactions require both time and cognitive resources (MacMillan et al., 
2004). Team cognition enables members to formulate accurate teamwork and taskwork predictions (Cannon-Bowers et al., 
1993; Katz and Tushman, 1979), adapt their activities and behaviors in a collaborative way, and thereby increase overall team 
effectiveness (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 2001; Lewis, 2004). Without well-formed team cognition, team members will not 
be able to efficiently share knowledge and information, coordinate each other’s activities, resolve conflicts, or negotiate 
agreed-upon solutions (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 2001; Jackson et al., 1995; Walsh, 1995).  
There are different types of team cognition (for a review, see Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 2001). Among them, team types and 
task types of team cognition are most relevant for team performance (Mathieu et al., 2000). In a recent study of student 
software development teams, He et al. (2007) identify shared awareness of expertise location and shared task understanding 
as two key dimensions of team cognition. Shared awareness of expertise location refers to members’ shared awareness of 
other members’ knowledge and expertise in the team; shared task understanding refers to the mutually shared understanding 
of a focal task among team members.  
The development of team cognition requires frequent interactions among team members such as communications and 
working together (He et al., 2007). Free-riding, however, impedes the development of team cognition by inducing individuals 
to shirk from collective actions. Regarding the two dimensions of team cognition, I propose:  
Hypothesis 3: The scale of free-riding has a negative effect on the level of shared awareness of expertise location in the team.   
Hypothesis 4: The scale of free-riding has a negative effect on the level of shared task understanding in the team.   
The team cognition research has repeatedly observed that teams perform better if they have developed mature team cognition 
(Liang et al., 1995; Hollingshead, 1998; Moreland and Myaskovsky, 2000; Lewis, 2004; He et al., 2007). The empirical 
evidence supports team cognition as an important determinant for the effectiveness of working teams (Walsh, 1995; Cannon-
Bowers and Salas, 2001; Mohammed and Dumville, 2001). 
Hypothesis 5: The level of shared awareness of expertise location has a positive effect on team performance. 
Hypothesis 6: The level of shared task understanding has a positive effect on team performance. 
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While team cognition may strongly mediate the effects of free-riding on team performance, previous studies have not 
assessed the extent of the mediation. As an exploratory study on the issue, I propose that team cognition partially mediates 
the negative effects of free-riding on team performance. 
Hypothesis 7: The scale of free-riding has a negative effect on team performance after controlling the effects of shared 
awareness of expertise location and shared task understanding. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The study selected student software development teams as the research subject. Beyond the practical advantage of sampling 
convenience, the decision was made mainly for the expected homogeneity among student backgrounds, which would lower 
the risk of unexpected confounding effects caused by diversity among ages, experiences, organizational culture, management 
levels etc.  
A synthetic software development task was designed to test the research model. Synthetic tasks are “research tasks 
constructed by systematic abstraction from a corresponding real-world task” (Martin et al., 1998; p. 123). Performance on a 
synthetic task should exercise some of the same behavioral and cognitive skills associated with the real-world task, while 
avoiding the complexity (for example, the existence of various confounding factors that may lower the opportunity of 
observing significant effects of the investigated factors) encountered in an uncontrolled field study of real tasks.  
The synthetic task employed in this study was the development of a relational database system using Microsoft Access. 
Except for team formation and task deadline, participants were free to set their own schedules and procedures to carry out 
their tasks, simulating the software development process in a realistic manner. 
Participants 
143 undergraduates enrolled in an information systems course formed teams to fulfill a course requirement of collaboratively 
developing a relational database system over a 5-week period. The students were juniors (about 24%), seniors (about 65%), 
and fifth-year business majors (about 11%). When the project was assigned, students were instructed to form three-member 
teams and were allowed to make their own teammate selections. Some students selected acquaintances as teammates, while 
others chose students who happened to be seated nearby. Forty-four teams were formed: 7 teams with two members, 19 
teams with three members, and 18 teams with four members.  
Data Collection 
During the software development process, students were asked to answer an online survey regarding their participation and 
team performance every week over a four week period. The first survey was conducted one week after the start of the project. 
Although encouraged by the course instructor, taking the survey was voluntary. Students were told that the survey responses 
would not influence their grades in any way. Some students failed to answer the survey on time, and some submitted 
incomplete answers. This resulted in 492 usable sets of individual data for analysis, or an 86.5% effective response rate.  
Measurement 
Free-riding: So far, free-riding has been studied largely with mathematical models and conceptual discussions. There is no 
commonly-accepted measure in the literature to assess the scale of free-riding in team settings.  
Unlike other team-level measures such as team performance, free-riding is to detect and assess the undesirable shirking 
behaviors from few, not all, team members on assigned team tasks. Thus, a potential instrument should be carefully designed 
to capture the lowest level, rather than the average level, of participation among team members. Based on discussion with 
students as well as personal experiences, I developed an instrument with two-step questions to measure the level of the lowest 
participation in teams. Students were first asked to identify a teammate who had contributed the least in their teams. Then, 
they were asked by nine questions to assess the level of participative activities performed by the teammate. The rationale of 
this design was explained explicitly on the questionnaire: low levels of participation on team assignments will be viewed as 
free-riding; if the reported participation of the least involved teammate is of high levels, the team will be assessed with no or 
little free-riding.  
Other Measures: In this study, team morale, team size, team cognition including shared awareness of expertise location and 
shared task understanding, and team performed were measured to test the research model. Team morale was measured by a 
six-item instrument about members’ attitudes (or the perceived importance) of their team assignments; shared awareness of 
expertise location and shared task understanding were each measured by a four-item instrument adopted from He et al. 
(2007). Team performance was measured by a five-item instrument adapted from Robey et al. (1993). Individual responses of 
these measures will be averaged within teams to form team-level data for testing.   
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These instruments are reported in the Appendix.  
RESULTS 
Construct Validity 
The test of construct validity was conducted with Partial Least Squares (PLS) – a structural equation modeling (SEM) 
technique that has been commonly used in IS research. Similar to other SEM techniques (e.g., LISREL), PLS tests the 
validity of constructs and the structural model at the same time, and is therefore considered methodologically rigorous when 
compared with regression-based techniques who separate the test of construct validity (e.g., factor analysis) from the test of 
the research model (Gefen et al., 2000). Two other distinctive features of PLS made the technique a particularly suitable 
testing tool for this study: 
1. PLS has the flexibility of accepting single-item constructs (i.e., team size in this study); 
2. The algorism of PLS, which is component-based rather than covariance-based, allows the modeling of formative 
indicators (Chin 1998).  In this study, the construct of free-riding was modeled as formative indicators based on its 
conceptulizations and operationalizations (questions asking the performance of a certain set of activities). 
The design of the new instrument of free-riding suggests the measure be modeled as a formative indicator in hypothesis 
testing. Conventional procedures used to assess the validity of reflective constructs (e.g., factor analysis) may not be 
appropriate for assessing the validity of formative constructs (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). In this study, a 
multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) method with special modification for assessing formative constructs (Loch et al., 2003) was 
used to examine the convergent and discriminant validity of a new measure of free-riding. This method is also practiced in 
Marakas et al. (2007) for the development of different types of computer self-efficacy. 
In this method, a composite score of each formative indicator was calculated based on the sum of products between its 
formative items and their associated weights. The weight represents the extent to which an item contributes to the overall 
value of a latent variable. A correlation matrix is then calculated between items of formative constructs and all constructs 
under study. To establish convergent validity, items should correlate high with items measuring the same construct, and low 
with items measuring other constructs. To establish discriminant validity, items should correlate high with the assigned 
constructs and low with unassigned ones. Following the guideline, the resulted correlation matrix was examined and all the 
abovementioned rules were satisfied. Thus, the validity of the formative construct of free-riding was concluded. 
Assessing the validity of reflective items follows the conventional practice based on the examination of construct reliability, 
convergent validity, and discriminant validity. Construct validity can be assessed by composite reliability calculated in PLS 
(should be larger than 0.70). Convergent validity can be assessed by the average variance extracted (AVE) among measures 
(should be larger than 0.50). Discriminant validity can be assessed by comparing the square root of AVEs and inter-construct 
correlations – the former should be larger than the latter to support disciminant validity. Close examination of Table 1 
suggested that all the conditions were satisfied. Thus, validity of the reflective indicators under study was concluded. 
  Reliability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Team Morale 0.97 0.922             
2. Team Size 1 0.173 1           
3. Free-Riding† - -0.615 0.037 -         
4. Expertise Location 0.96 0.310 0.226 -0.266 0.927       
5. Task Understanding 0.95 0.487 0.244 -0.357 0.619 0.91     
6. Team Performance 0.96 0.422 0.243 -0.312 0.589 0.671 0.91   
7. Time of Measurement 1 0.063 0.011 -0.037 0.364 0.286 0.369 1 
Notes: 
1. Reliability: composite reliability calculated in PLS  
2. Numbers in bold on the leading diagonal are the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) 
among reflective measures. For discriminant validity of constructs, diagonal elements should be larger 
than off-diagonal elements. 
3. Off diagonal elements are correlations among constructs. 
4. † Free-riding is modeled as formative indicators in the study. Calculations of construct reliability and 
shared variance are not relevant for the construct.  
Table 1. Inter-Construct Correlations 




The test of the research model and the results are presented in Figure 2. Examination of the resulting path significances 
suggested that most hypotheses were supported by the data sample at α=0.05 level. The effect of free-riding on team 
performance, after controlling the two team cognition dimensions (i.e., shared awareness of expertise location and shared task 
understanding), however, was found to be insignificant (p=0.332). The results suggest that the effect of free-riding on team 
performance is fully mediated by team cognition.  
 
Note:  
1. Dashed lines indicate insignificance with p>0.05 (2-sided). 
2. * p=0.053; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (2-sided) 
Figure 2. Testing Results 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Few people doubt the deteriorating effects of free-riding on collective actions. But to what extent does free-riding impair 
team performance? The data from the sampled student software development teams shows that the negative effect of free-
riding on team performance is significant and moderately large (r = -0.312, p < 0.001). Such effect is fully mediated by team 
cognition (measured by shared awareness of expertise location and shared task understanding). This finding suggests that the 
free-rider problem impairs team performance by impeding the development of collective mental models among team 
members.  
As expected, team morale was found to be negatively associated with, and team size was positively associated with, the scale 
of free-riding in the sampled teams. This result suggests that developing positive attitudes (or perceived importance) of the 
assigned team tasks and reducing team sizes are two effective means for counteracting free-riding among team members. One 
may note that the effect of team size was marginally significant (p=0.053) in Figure 2. Considering the comparatively low 
diversity among team sizes (the sampled teams had two, three, or four members in each team), the influence of team size on 
free-riding should not be ignored. In large software development teams (common in real business settings), the attention on 
each individual team member may be diluted by the number of participants in the team as well as the increased complexity of 
team tasks. Teammates often have limited knowledge or awareness on the particular task that one is working on. Thus, 
reducing team size could be an effective method of counteracting free-riding by increasing peer pressure on one’s 
participation. Future research with large teams is needed to clarity the issue.  
The research model does not include the time variable, which has recently received increased attention in IS research (Sarker 
and Sahay, 2004; Saunders, 2007). The team literature has long recognized the influence of time on team behavior (Tuckman, 
1965; Wheelan and Hochberger, 1996). For example, team transition model (Gersick, 1989) argues that the urgency of 
deadlines helps teams alternate the inertia in team behaviors and themes through which they approach their work. As time 
passes, the awareness of deadline will alert team members the necessarily of adjusting their behaviors to assure the project 
being completed within schedule. Thus, one may expect that free-riding will decrease with the progress of the project. This is 
not observed in the sampled teams. The correlation between the time of measurement and the scale of free-riding was found 
to be insignificant (reported in Table 1). Future research is needed to clarify the effect of time on free-riding.   
Although the results are encouraging, the study has several limitations. One is about the measurement of free-riding. Free-
riding was measured by a newly development instrument rather than an existing measure from the literature. The 
development of the new instrument can be viewed as a contribution to the field; however, the validity of the new instrument 
needs to be tested in future studies.  
















R2 = 0.399 
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All the constructs except team size were self-reported by sampled students. Thus, common-method bias could be another 
concern for the study. By aggregating individual responses to form team level measures, this concern may be alleviated in 
that multiple responses could cancel out each other’s errors. To assess the extent of common method variance, I performed 
Harman's single factor test by loading all of the items in this study into an exploratory factor analysis. Although a widely 
used diagnostic technique, Podsakoff et. al. (2003) criticized the Harman method for its ambiguity about the source of the 
variance extracted by a single factor. The extracted variance from the single factor could be caused by the use of common 
method, lack of discriminant validity, and/or the existence of causal relationships among the investigated constructs.  
To assess the source of the extracted variance, I performed two Harman’s single-factor tests with the objective measure of 
team size included and excluded respectively. With team size included, an emerged single factor explained 36.81% of the 
covariance among the measures. With team size excluded, the variance extracted from a single factor increased to 37.95%. 
The trivial difference (about 1.1% of the total variance) provides strong evidence that there is no substantial common method 
variance present.  
This study selected student software development teams as the research subject. Thus, special caution is needed when 
applying the findings to teams of other settings. Student teams differ from other teams in many ways. For example, the 
incentive systems are weak in student teams mostly because of the lack of severe consequence of free-riding; but in real 
business settings, failing to meet co-workers’ expectations is likely to affect the prosperity of one’s career. Future research is 
desired to test the generalizability of the findings in various contexts. 
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Free-riding (a two-step measure) 
Step 1: Now recall the whole project development process. Select a member who has contributed to the project the least 
in your group (other than you).   Note: if the person you selected has contributed a lot (as reflected in the next set of 
questions), it means that everyone has worked hard on this project and there is no free-rider in your team.  
Step 2: Do you agree with the following statements regarding the person's contribution to the project? 
1. The person did NOT participate in group meetings. 
2. The person did NOT communicate with other members. 
3. The person could NOT be reached by email or telephone. 
4. The person did NOT take responsibility for his/her part of the project development. 
5. The person did NOT contribute any creative idea to the project. 
6. The person did provide meaningful suggestions/advices to the project. 
7. The person's knowledge has great significance to this project. 
8. Compare with my efforts, I think the person has contributed significantly to the group project. 
9. Overall, the person has contributed a lot to this project. 
 
Team Morale (a collective measure of attitudes toward team assignments)  
Do you agree that you and your fellow members believe ... 
1. This assignment is important to all team members. 
2. Everyone should work hard on this assignment. 
3. Everyone should commit heavily to this assignment. 
4. Nobody should "escape" from doing the assignment. 
5. Teamwork is important to your group's success. 
6. People should work closely to get the job done. 
 
Shared awareness of expertise location 
Do your team members know each other's skills and expertise... 
1. The team had a good "map" of each other's talents and skills. 
2. Team members were assigned to tasks commensurate with their task-relevant knowledge and skill. 
3. Team members knew what task-related skills and knowledge they each possess. 
4. Team members knew who on the team has specialized skills and knowledge that is relevant to their work. 
 
Shared Task Understanding 
Do you agree with the following statements? 
1. Team members had a common understanding of the application domain (i.e., inventory management) that the 
system was supposed to support. 
2. Team members had a common understanding of the technologies used in the development process. 
3. Team members had a common understanding of the project development procedures. 
4. Overall, team members shared their visions of the project. 
 
Team Performance 
Please evaluate performance of the project team in the past one week regarding ...   
1. the amount of work the team produced. 
2. the efficiency of team operations. 
3. the team's adherence to the schedule. 
4. the quality of work the team produced. 
5. the effectiveness of the team's interactions with people outside the team. 
